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SOCIAL CONTROL. XIII.

THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL.

I.

IF a number of institutions that mutually determine each other may be said to form a system, then we may properly speak of "the system of social control." Certainly there is a division of labor tending to assign to each form of control that work for which it is best fitted. Law concerns itself with that undesirable conduct which is at once important and capable of clear definition. Central positive qualities—courage or veracity in man, chastity in woman—are taken in charge by the sense of honor or self-respect. The religious sanction is ordinarily reserved for those acts and abstinences requiring the utmost backing. Religion mounts guard over the ancient, unvarying fundamentals of group life, but deals little with the temporary adjustments required from time to time. The taking of life or property, adultery, unfilial conduct, and false swearing encounter its full force; but not adulteration, stock gambling, or corporation frauds. In code as in ritual and belief religion betrays its archaic character.

In morals as well as in microscopes we have a major and a minor adjusting apparatus. In adaptability public opinion stands at one end of a series of which religion is the other extreme. Connected with this is a gradation in the nature of the sanction. Public opinion bans many things not unlawful, law may require much more than self-respect, and self-respect may be wounded by that which is not regarded as sinful. But the universality of the sanction grows as the scope of prohibition narrows. In the first case the offender encounters the public here and now, in the second the crystallized disapproval of society, in the third the opinion of generations of men who have conspired to frame a standard or ideal, and in the last case the frown of the Ruler of the Universe.

The champions of each detail of regulation strive, therefore, to get these successive sanctions behind their commandments. The opponents of drinking, dancing, divorce, usury, horseracing, dueling, speculation, or prize fighting, strive to make the practices first blameworthy, then unlawful, then shameful, and finally sinful. But this massing of sanctions is very naturally resisted. The attempt to get God against a new vice, such as liquor selling, always encounters fierce opposition from those who find themselves suddenly shut out from the odor of sanctity. New moral tests, like new party tests, endanger ground already won, and so imperil the sanctions for the major virtues. It is not well, therefore, to associate loss of honor with white lies or the Divine Displeasure with card playing. Sympathy, religious sentiment, self-respect, sense of duty, fear, regard for public opinion, enlightened self-interest—each has its place and its task, and no one motive should be overworked.

The community draws no firm line between what offends it and what harms it. The ideals held up for imitation include table manners as well as honesty. Public disapproval must be faced by the non-conforming freethinker or dress-reformer as well as the swindler and the traitor. Religion claims its holy days and its fasts as well as just dealings. At times even the law becomes the instrument of a tyrannous majority. Codes, standards, and moral distinctions have crystallized out of collective feeling, and they will not draw a sharp line between public and private conduct unless collective feeling concerns itself exclusively with the collective interest. But this never occurs. The common resentment is never warden merely of the common welfare, but busies itself with sacrilege, profanity, sodomy, or cruelty to animals. It is thus that society comes to put its sanction behind the rules of private living, and even behind useless injunctions.

The margin of social control is a fluctuating margin. Just as law is always dying at some points and growing at others, so the requirements of public opinion or religion are ever changing. Society, while relinquishing its control over a man's Sundays,

his church connections, his clothes, and his expletives, is just beginning to regulate his treatment of his children, his drinking habits, and his expenditure on elections. The running of a scientific frontier between the individual and society is the joint task of two contrasted types of thought. The eighteenth-century philosophy, ardent for the individual, sought to draw about each man the largest possible inviolable circle. On all laws, restraints, moral requirements, and duties needlessly invading this circle, it has kept up a steady fire of criticism and remonstrance. Nineteenth-century thought, on the other hand, convinced that if there be no God, King, State, Moral Order, or Scheme of Things to serve as fountain head of obligations, there is at least a Social Interest, has been diligent to show all hidden and unsuspected ways in which the interest of many is harmed by this or that exercise of power. Consequently it has become sponsor for a multitude of new commandments and duties. These two tendencies have not resulted in deadlock, as some imagine, but in a thorough overhauling and testing of every detail of restraint which will result, let us hope, in giving us the most welfare for the least abridgment of liberty.

Changes in knowledge, in degree of civilization, and in the character of social requirements cause a method of control to wax or wane from age to age. We might compare the social order to a viaduct across some wooded ravine in the Sierras which rests part of its weight on timbers that decay with the lapse of time, and part on living tree trunks which constantly gain in strength. Or we might liken it to a bridge resting on piers built, some of stone which crumbles in time, and some of stone which hardens with long exposure to the air. No doubt etiquette and ceremony have done their best work. The seer of visions and dreamer of dreams has had his day. The hero will never again be the pivot of order. The reign of custom with its vague terrors is about over. The assizes of Osiris, Rhadamanthus, God, or Allah, with their books of record, inquisitions, and judgments, will hardly dominate the imagination in the days to come. The reputed dispensations of Providence will less and

less affect conduct. A fictive blood kinship cannot bind men into the national groups of today. So public action in the form of mob, ban, or boycott is justly regarded as a relic of barbarism.

On the other hand, instruction as to the consequences of actions, with a view to enlisting an enlightened self-interest in support of all the conduct it is competent to sanction, will meet with universal approval in an age of public education; and the passiveness of the average mind will make it safe to work into such moral instruction certain convenient illusions and fallacies which it is nobody's interest to denounce. Suggestion, that little understood instrument, will no doubt be found increasingly helpful in establishing moral imperatives in the young. But it will render its greatest service in shaping in youth those feelings of admiration or loathing that determine the ruling ideals of character, and in influencing those imputations of worth which enable society to impose upon the individual its own valuations of life's activities and experiences. And society will further the work by cutting with cameo-like clearness the types of character it chooses to commend, and by settling ever more firmly, in tradition and convention, the values it seeks to impose. But from social art we have the most to look for. I would place it next to religion in power to transform the brute into the angel. Art is one of the few moral instruments which, instead of being blunted by the vast changes in opinion, have gained edge and sweep by these very changes. So far as eye can pierce the future, there is nothing to limit or discredit it. The sympathies it fosters do not, it is true, establish norms and duties; but they lift that plane of general sentiment out of which imperatives and obligations arise. If there is anyone in this age who does the work of the Isaiahs and Amoses of old, it is an Ibsen, a Tolstoi, a Victor Hugo, or a Thomas Hardy.

II.

It is a mistake to suppose there will be less need in the future for society to dominate the souls of its members. On the

contrary, we may expect the more far-reaching and pervasive means of control, such as suggestion, ideals, and social valuations, to be used in the twentieth century much more freely and consciously than they now are. The ground for such belief is the visible disruption of the *community* and the rise of *society* as claimant of all allegiances and object of all duties. So far as *community* extends people naturally keep themselves orderly, and there is no call to put them under the yoke of an elaborate discipline. The sense of a common life that grows up in the family, the kindred, the neighborhood, the circle of companions, or the band of comrades, leads relatives, neighbors and mates to love and understand one another, to yield one to another, and to observe those forbearances and offices that make associate life a success. To people abiding in such natural relations the apparatus of control appears as an impediment and an impertinence. The reaction of man against man and a kind of reciprocal constraint will, of course, show itself among kinsmen and neighbors; but of control, formal and organized, there will be little sign.

Now these natural bonds are ceasing to bind men as men must be bound in the aggregates of today. Kinship has lost its sacred significance and binding force. Social erosion has reduced the family to parents and young. Marriage has become a contract, terminable almost at pleasure. Nearness of dwelling means little in the country and nothing in the town. To the intimacy of the country-side succeeds the "multitudinous desolation" of the city. The workingman has become a bird of passage. Touch-and-go acquaintanceship takes the place of those lasting attachments that form between neighbors who have lived, labored and holidayed together.

It is true that while the local group dissolves new forms of union arise. Friendship is freer, and hence firmer, and there are bonds of fellowship growing up between co-religionists, fellow-craftsmen, or people of the same social class. But these forms of social feeling repose not on blood or nearness or intercourse, but on personal preference. They are after the manner of

friendship which implies freedom and choice. The new forms of spontaneous association, as they imply a preference of some over others, do not embrace all those of a given place, or who have dealings one with another. Consequently they do not foster that community spirit which is the natural support of restraints and duties. We dare not establish obligation upon one of these special feelings; for the circle of obligation must be as wide as the circle of contacts, else order fails and the community perishes of partisanship or class feeling or religious hatreds.

It is not to be denied that sympathy has gained in range and that there is now a civic, national, or racial community binding men into groups much larger than the Semitic "tribe," the Greek "city," the Teutonic "kindred," the mediæval "town," or the New World "settlement." But these new communities are not tissues formed of the interlacing tendrils of individual lives. They are born of effort and maintained by the use of appropriate means. Civic pride and public spirit are often hothouse plants, and we see patriotism, the specific bond of the national community, openly fostered by art, ceremony, ideal, and symbol. We must face the fact, therefore, that the *community*, undermined by the stream of change, has caved in carrying with it part of the foundations of order. While not overlooking that growth of intelligence which, by enabling us to comprehend large bodies of people at a distance, invites fellowship to overleap the limits of personal contact, I am bound to say that we are relying on artificial rather than natural supports to bear the increasing weight of our social order, and that a return to a natural basis of social partnership seems about as unlikely as a return to natural food or natural locomotion.

The reader may shudder at the thought of modern society precariously rearing its huge bulk above the devouring waves of selfishness like a Venice built on piles. But it is perhaps no worse than man's depending on cultivated instead of wild fruits, or removing the seats of his civilization to climates where only artificial heat can keep alive through the winter. So long as

there is bread and coal enough, what matters our dependence on art! And so long as society can stamp its standards and values on its members, what matters our dependence on forms of control!

Not that the future is secure. The crash may yet come through the strife of classes, each unable to master the others by means of those influences that subdue the individual. But if it comes, it will be due to the mal-distribution of wealth effected by new, blind, economic forces we have not learned to regulate, and will no more discredit the policy of social control than the failure of the mountain reservoir discredits irrigation.

III.

From the recorded social experience of five thousand years it ought to be possible to draw true criteria for judging a method of control. Even our brief reconnoissance enables us to declare that the marks of a good disciplinary agent include the following:

Economy.—On this principle a method that molds character is superior to one that deals merely with conduct, the symptom or index of character. A roundabout way, such as the imparting of social valuations, is preferable to the direct method of playing upon hopes and fears. A far-sighted policy, such as the training of the young, excels the summary regulation of the adult. In the concrete these maxims mean that the priest is often cheaper than the policeman, the school costs less than the prison, and the Sunday school saves at Botany Bay. And accordingly we can recommend the salutation of the flag in the army to the court martial, prefer a little reform school for the boy to much jail for the man, and declare it better to reform the offender, once we have him, than to catch and convict him again.

Inwardness.—Sanction operates only so long as it is sure. Let witnesses be wanting or authority weak, and the ill will issues in deed. Consequently the control of the will by suggestion is to be preferred to control of the will by hopes and fears; and a flank movement aiming to influence feelings and judg-

ments is better tactics than a direct assault on the volitions. The lodgment of a social ideal in the soul's inner citadel gives a steadier ascendancy than assemblage, festival, public worship, or ceremony at stated occasions. An impression upon the judgment is worth more than an effervescent sentiment, such as is evoked by music. But moral precepts that seduce the judgment by masquerading as worldly wisdom may not always be relied on either. They bind a man in so far as his choices are ruled by rational considerations; but plays and tales will never tire of showing the pet maxims of reasonable conduct swept aside by imperious instincts, passions, and emotions.

The best guarantee of a stable control from within is something that will reach at once sentiment, reason, and will. Consequently a religion is widely effective for righteousness in so far as it is strong in these three directions. It should strike the chord of feeling, but not so exclusively as Quakerism, or Shinto, or the Religion of Humanity, or Neo-Catholicism. It should teach a day of reckoning, but not dwell on it so much as Islam or primitive Methodism. It should address the judgment, but not become so baldly rational as the English church in the time of Tillotson. The secret of the limited habitat of certain sects is found in a narrowness of appeal that restricts them to certain temperaments or certain social layers.

Simplicity of belief basis.—Elements of conviction are, of course, associated with most forms of control. But when a type of restraint rests squarely on an unverifiable dogma, such as the Last Judgment, the Unseen Friend, or the Divine Fatherhood, it must be regarded askance, however transcendent its services. Either the dogma crumbles, and with it the restraint, leaving the last state of a man worse than the first; or else the dogma obstinately kept as a moral fulcrum becomes a stumbling-block to enlightenment, a bar to progress, a shelter to superstition, and an offense to that intellectual honesty and sincerity which is one of the most precious instincts of the modern man. But of course dogmas differ vastly both in their value to morals and their harm to science.

Decentralized management.—It is bad for the enginery of discipline to lie in the hands of a small part of society, an élite, class, caste, or profession. In some cases this may be necessary in order to curb and civilize a backward many. But we have only to recall the despotism of Druids, Brahmins, Magi, Spanish priests, Scotch ministers, and New England parsons to see that the few will always push their interferences to excess. Moreover, the wielding of the instruments of power gives an opportunity for personal or class aggrandizement that is rarely neglected. Provided the dominant few are well organized or knit together, their class egoism is bound to assert itself. Witness the riches, exemptions, and license of the mediæval Catholic hierarchy. So a vast administrative system holding in order a heterogeneous people is sure to become a screen for aggrandizement. But it is when the official and ecclesiastical hierarchies work together, as under Henry VIII, Philip II, Louis XIV, or Nicholas II, that the exploitation feature becomes most noticeable.

There is always danger that the desiderata of joint life will be lost sight of in the zeal to make men over by the clever manipulation of powerful influences. Thus the Quixotic ideal of "one language, one church, one government," too ardently pursued, leads Russia into high-handed persecution of Raskolniks and Stundists. The exuberance of fanatics and pietists must be checked and naked righteousness held up as the one thing needful. Those who command the machinery of church and state come to entertain large designs for dominating the mind with dogma and priestcraft, gag and censor; but these ambitious designs to make men as bricks are turned out of the mold can be frustrated by the *diffusion of control*.

Professor Burgess has shown¹ how *individual liberty* had to be recognized and organized into the state as well as *government*. Now it is equally necessary that in the moral sphere liberty should get so intrenched as to offer stout resistance to all excessive control. The moral individualism that follows like a

¹ In his *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, Vol. I.

shadow the continuing aggregation of mankind into larger wholes testifies to the need of a brake on moral centralization. In the little tribe or city-state of antiquity the social spirit ruled unquestioned, and the open cult of the individual would have been like touching off a powder magazine. But with far-flung dominion, elaborate religions, organized priesthoods, and vast school systems designed to impose ready-made formulæ, the man is liable to be held too firmly in the network. The ascendancy of society becomes easy and hence dangerous. Law-maker, official, priest, parson, schoolmaster, master of ceremonies, or moral philosopher exact much more than they need to ask for. On behalf of God or prince, neighbor or group, one is called upon to give up the most that makes life worth the living. Accordingly, freedom becomes a passion, *laissez faire* a dogma, skepticism a religion, and all the rills of opposition run together into a great current of opposition, which accompanies the development of control as a check and a reminder.

Worse than the strait-jacket of the Pharisee is the warping of human nature with moral appliances. To get stern self-discipline it is necessary to split up the soul into the acting self and the watching self. But this means the loss of that wholesome unconsciousness and outlook which is the birthright of healthy beings. The conscientious man is a kind of degenerate. The heart-searching, spirit-wrestling self-examination that is fostered by all moralizing schemes may help multitudes to a better life, but it is not the crown and roof of the human spirit. To him who has arrived at frank, communal feeling the groanings and wrestlings, the Puritan conscience, the sin notion, the fussiness of the moral novice, will perhaps become, like the whip and hair-shirt, mere memories of a bad dream. And in his "eventual element of calm" he may echo the sentiment of Walt Whitman:

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contained'd,

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,

They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,

They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another or to one of his kind that lived thousands of years
ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.¹

IV.

To expose the antinomy that lies at the foundation of society and to show faiths, moralities, and wisdom, in all their nakedness as so many ways of luring a man from the pursuit of his private welfare is to subvert all control save that of force. "In vain in the sight of the bird the net of the fowler is spread." One who learns why society is urging him into the strait and narrow way will resist its pressure. One who sees clearly the method of control will thenceforth be emancipated. Of course he may cleave to goodness and justice—they are not exotic to human nature—but no one knowingly consents to be controlled. To betray the secrets of social ascendancy is to forearm the individual in his struggle with society. If at the hour that now strikes the Anglo-Saxon is over-regulated, his conscience too sensitive, his ideals too imperious, his conduct too devoted, his proper development checked, then let us show him the net in which he is taken. But if he still thwarts his fellows more than our control thwarts him, let us beware of rashly strengthening an individualism already too rampant.

Since the days of Reimarus and Priestley bold scientific analysis has destroyed vicious forms of control guarded by darkness and superstition, till it has become an acknowledged axiom that all dissections may take place in public. It is now an article of faith that truth can never harm and cannot be proclaimed too widely. When human action is seen to be influenced by baseless faiths or wrong ideas, it has been assumed that we cannot too quickly foster doubt and question. But this optimism has prevailed simply because the iconoclasm of natural science could do little harm so long as the veil was not lifted from those sacred recesses where are prepared the convictions and sentiments by

¹ *Leaves of Grass*, "Song of Myself."

which society holds together. Science, like Bishop Blougram, might "cut and cut again," but found "ever a next in size now grown as big."

But rising sociology will put to the test this childlike faith in the naked truth. When we learn the sources of the Nile flood of idealism that makes the desert to blossom with virtues, when we behold those mysterious processes that take place in the soul of a people, when the products of the social mind are split up into their elements, we shall realize, no doubt, what it is that holds men together. And when the hour of illumination comes, will the social scientist light-heartedly assail every conviction or ideal he cannot rationalize? Will not the loyal investigator hesitate to send the tell-tale carmine stain into every filament that helps hold the individual in the mesh of unsuspected influences?

The secret of order is, therefore, not to be bawled from every housetop. The fact of control is no gospel to be preached abroad with allegory and parable, with bold type and scare headlines. The social investigator will show religion a consideration it has rarely met with in the natural scientist. He will venerate the moral system too much to uncover its nakedness. He will speak to men, not to youth. He will address himself to those who administer the moral capital of society; to teachers, clergymen, editors, lawmakers, and judges, who wield the instruments of control; to poets, artists, thinkers, and educators, who are the guides of the human caravan. Some may scent danger in a science keeping itself half esoteric. But surely the men of widest horizon and farthest vision who, making the joint welfare their own, wage perpetual war against predatory appetite, greedy ambition, unblushing impudence, and brutal injustice, may safely be intrusted with the secrets of control! When control ceases to be necessary, we can tell the "recruty," the street Arab, and the Elmira "inmate" how it was done. Until then, discretion!

V.

I cannot too strongly urge the study of moral influences by the right persons and in the right spirit as a basis for a scientific

control of the individual. The foundations of order must be laid completely bare ere we can wisely go about to broaden or underpin them. Many great thinkers have begun the task, but in their eagerness to have this pier strengthened or that pillar kept, they have failed to make a thorough exploration. In his *Republic*, Plato has given perhaps the best review of the conditions of order. But Machiavelli uttered certain of its secrets. Rousseau fingered the springs of social feeling. Burke laid down the requisites of stability. Napoleon told how men are governed. Carlyle demonstrated the value of persons. Mazzini preached the efficacy of ideals. Horace Mann championed the worth of enlightenment. Victor Hugo showed what society owes to art. Guyeau pointed out the power of suggestion. Ibsen reminds of the curative value of freedom. But too often each has declared his own the cornerstone and reviled those who found solidity in some other prop or buttress. And society, distracted by the cries of partisans, has excitedly torn down or hastily built up the various supports of its order with little rational idea of what it was doing.

The social system of control has been a dark jungle harboring warring bands of guerrillas; but when investigators with the scientific method have fully occupied this region the disorder and dacoity ought to cease. Surely there must be some general principles from the vantage ground of which to pass upon the conflicting pretensions of drill sergeant and anarchist, of authoritarian and suasionist, of priest and schoolmaster, of censor and artist, of Jesuit and freethinker, of tory and radical, of prude and Adamite, of moral philosopher and evolutionist. And these we shall get when an exploration of the subject shall show how many modes and instruments of social control there are, and enable us to appraise each at its true value. As soon as the conditions which reconcile order with progress are made clear to the leaders of opinion, the control of society over its members ought to become more conscious and effective than it now is, and the dismal see-sawing between change and reaction that has been the curse of this century ought to disappear.

APPLICATIONS.

I.

Sociology.—At its début sociology commended itself chiefly by its skill in accounting for institutions, *i. e.*, those fixed arrangements that prevail among the changing members of society. Mr. Spencer, for example, took for his task the exploration of six great groups of institutions. But the question, "What induces the individual to enter into and abide by these arrangements?" was not raised. The early writers, betrayed by the organism analogy, did not inquire how grasping, self-assertive individuals are brought to hold together in these social organs and achieve these smooth coöperations. Their unavowed postulate was that all men, save a few aggressive, hell-fire wretches, are naturally fit for coöperation. But this is like accounting for the solar system without universal gravitation.

The truth just coming into focus, that *all groups and organs constantly exercise manifold cohesive pressures and attractions upon their units*, is a discovery of the first order, and cannot fail to influence the future of social science. From the explanation of the institution sociologists are likely to press on to explain the genesis of the social man who makes the institution possible. Certainly the delicate, almost transparent, network of suggestion, belief, ideal, and valuation, in which the individual is caught as a fly in a kind of beneficent gossamer web, is just the tangle to challenge the utmost insight and ingenuity of the student of society.

II.

The philosophy of history.—There are "historical materialists," such as Loria, Labriola, and Brooks Adams, who insist, in the words of Karl Marx, that "the method of production determines the social, political, and spiritual life-processes in general." The rise and vicissitudes of states, codes, legal principles, religions, systems of philosophy, moral theories, and even schools of art, they would trace to economic causes. For example,

the key to the development of Roman Law is the rise of private property in land on the ruins of communal ownership. The dogma of a future life prevailed because so convenient in reconciling the exploited classes to their misery in this life. The Reformers' doctrine of "justification by faith" met the desire of thrifty burghers to evade money payments to priests by becoming their own intercessors with the Deity. "Equality," the "rights of man," the "dignity of labor," are merely the wind-driven foam of democracy which is at bottom the overwhelming of feudal landowners by the possessors of movable capital.

Undoubtedly the higher departments of culture reflect the economic system, and especially the relations of superiority and subordination between classes. But surely greater than the economic opposition of master and slave, lord and serf, priest and layman, proprietor and proletarian, capitalist and laborer, is that everlasting clash of interest of a man with other men which constitutes the opposition of the individual and society. More than any class conflict has this shaped the development of normative ideas. And if this is so, we have new light on the interpretation of history. To put it in a nutshell, the spiritual life of society seems determined chiefly by three forces. These are (*a*) the accumulations of knowledge, (*b*) the demands of social control, and (*c*) the demands of control by an exploiting class. With these it is astonishing how far one can go in accounting for the metamorphoses of faith, the phases of morals, the mutations of law, and the changes in the ideals of life held up in literature and art.

The philosophers love to regard a system of philosophy as the clear reflection of extant knowledge and to see in the history of thought simply the movement of the human intellect. How naïve! As if this erratic line of march did not suggest a running fight with an unseen foe! As if the positions successively taken up by theology or ethics did not betray the squirming, kicking son of Adam trying to wriggle from under the social knee! One who has seen how the social system constantly trembles from the straining egoism of its units and

classes would as soon ignore the moon in attempting a theory of tides as ignore social control in accounting for the evolution of dogma, or metaphysics, or moral doctrines. In truth a *Weltanschauung* can never win to wide favor unless it "squares" the guardians of order. Therefore a synthesis that attains to great and lasting favor, like Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, the theology of Thomas Aquinas, the Leibnitzian system, the "common-sense philosophy," or German Idealism, should not be taken seriously, since it is merely an attempt to reconcile extant knowledge with the requirements of social control. When a theory of the world is promulgated, one asks, "Is it true?" ninety-nine ask, "Does it provide a firm basis for religion and morals?" "Philosophy," says Novalis finely, "cannot bake bread; but she can give us God, Freedom, Immortality." "True," answers the sociologist, "but *these* can bake bread."

III.

Moral education.—On all sides our educators are voicing a demand for a moral instruction of the young that shall bear fruit in more abundant righteousness. The work of the church and the home is not up to the level of today's requirements, and the need is openly acknowledged of making the school a moral engine. The partisans of ecclesiastical control have been prompt to turn to account the admission that in our schemes of intellectual instruction there is something left out. But we cannot fall back upon their church schools, which provide, it is true, a measure of control, but at what cost of mental darkness! A way must be found to make the public schools effective for righteousness.

But if my *exposé* of social control is correct, such a way exists, and we need not be forced upon the horns of the dilemma either to leave the schools "godless," and therefore unmoral, or to make them moral by making them sectarian. In my studies entitled "Belief" and "Religion" I owned the moral value of belief. But elsewhere I described several non-religious types of control. The educator, in quest of a moral teaching that can

offend nobody, will find that several of the forces that bind the units of society are equally available in forming social character in children. The skillful and persistent *suggestion* of moral example and expectation by a person of prestige, such as the teacher; the holding up of *ideals* which are presented concretely and vividly, and are brought to bear upon the life of the pupil; the awakening of nascent sympathy by good *art*; the steady *enlightenment* of children as to the inevitable consequences of action — surely with such resources it ought to be possible to meet the demand for moral education without calling back the priest!

IV.

Social reconstruction.—If righteousness may not be taken for granted but is a social product, we may not assume a great and sudden increase of it, save as society can lay its hands on more effective instruments of control. Certain collectivists propose that the entire national production, now in charge of perhaps half a million private managers, should be intrusted to a gigantic administrative mechanism operating for the common benefit. We have but to note how complexity exposes private businesses to the slackness or dishonesty of agents and employés, and to observe how public business gives scope to the speculating ring or the blackmailing boss, to be convinced that the centralized system will but pave the way for the most stupendous corruption the world has seen, unless the then prevailing standard of moral character be much higher than it is today.

But this may not be presumed. Only appropriate means can achieve it. And since uplifting agencies must be provided, we may properly ask the Bellamyite, What fresh and powerful moral stimuli, what unused instruments of control, what new allies may society count upon to effect this great moral transformation? If collectivism, holding no new moral forces in the leash, merely commends us to agents already worked for all they are worth, the immediate socialist state may safely be dismissed as a chimera.

Among those who have a pretty clear insight into the mechanism of control are the apostles of anarchism. To them not only does law stand out clearly as coercion, but religion, moral standards, and systems of instruction all appear as so many ways of ensnaring the individual. But as the anarchist's roseate view of human nature forbids him to regard them as necessary to social order, he concludes they are means of class exploitation. Respectability is a fetich of bourgeois society. Moral standards are established by the rich and influential for the managing of the rest. The priest, with his faiths, catches and holds the sheep while the exploiters shear him. "Religion, authority, and state are all carved out of the same piece of wood : to the devil with them all!"

It is undoubtedly true that the social pressure is not equal upon all, that very frequently we can detect the cloven foot of class rule under the robe of judge, or priest, or schoolmaster. But this does not justify the anarchist's obstinate confidence in human nature. To him the discovery of a trammel on the sovereign individual is sufficient reason for removing it ; and he is a negationist because his sharpened sense smells control in all parts of our culture. The social scientist must admire his penetration, but deprecate his conclusions. Because his X-ray shows control in all the social tissues, because his spectroscope reveals the element of collective ascendancy in nearly every culture-product, the scientist does not deem it necessary to dissolve these tissues and destroy these products.

V.

Ethics.—Ethics may be either *individual* or *social*, the one laying down the rules to be observed by the individual in attaining the greatest worth of his personal life, the other laying down the rules to be observed by men in their relations one with another in attaining the greatest worth of their collective life. The former is ethics proper, the latter it is best to regard as a branch of sociology. Now current ethics professes to find these two sets of rules identical, and thus by one stroke betrays the

individual it advises, and encroaches upon the province of social science. The only hope for ethics as a science is to retire within its natural boundaries, and pronounce upon life and its problems from the standpoint of the liver of it.

What seduces the ethics people from their proper business and sets them to preaching is the delusion that with their demonstrations and admonitions they hold society together. Could anything be more naïve! If we depended on ethical instruction for justice and mercy, we should banquet on prisoners of war from the next county. The ethician is like the fly on the chariot wheel saying complacently, "See what a dust I raise!" Religion makes mock of ethics, and justly contrasts its mighty forces with the feebleness of moral demonstrations. But, *pace* Mr. Kidd, neither is religion the only thing that holds society together. Its partisans go about hawking their patent cement warranted to stand time, weather, and earthquake, but we shall not invest our bottom dollar with them.

In these papers I have described thirteen leading types of control. Of these only two belong strictly to religion, although a great historical edifice like Christianity, that has assembled all manner of riches under its dome, is able to secure the collaboration of six or seven of the chief moral agents of society. It is with justice, then, that we can deny to any one ally the sole guardianship of social order. By many ways unseen or scarcely guessed are men brought to live together peaceably. No single moral influence enjoys a monopoly. The ancient impression of man on man, of the multitude on the man, of the man on the multitude, of the old on the young, of the gifted upon the ungifted—so long as these are there, it will be possible to grow afresh the myths, ideals, values, symbols, and illusions that are the girders and tie-beams of the social edifice.

No doubt, as history shows us, there are times when every timber in the old house of order which has sheltered so many generations of men endures as if for a thousand years; and again there are seasons when one after another props settle, sills rot, beams crack, and the business of repair engages all minds. It

would seem that in this century society is passing through such a season ; and amid the decay of old authorities, reverences, and illusions in the critical atmosphere of our time many look for the roof and walls of the social order to come crashing upon our heads. But if my analysis be true, the case is not so bad as that. We must face the task of repair, but there grows good timber to replace the worm-eaten joists.

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